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Abstract  
This paper studies the effects of an interest barrier that was introduced in Finland 
to restrict the profit-shifting opportunities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
We employ full population data of Finnish, Swedish and Danish MNEs and a 
difference-in-differences methodology, where Swedish and Danish MNEs serve 
as a control group. We find that Finnish MNEs responded to the interest barrier 
by decreasing their financial expenses. Subsidiaries decreased also their long-
term debt levels. We do not find evidence of debt-shifting being replaced by 
transfer pricing. Neither do we find evidence of changes in output, suggesting 
that the interest barrier did not create distortions by affecting the real activity of 
MNEs. 
 
Key words: Corporate income tax, Multinational firms, Capital structure,  
Interest barriers 
JEL classes: H25, H26, G32  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Suomessa vuonna 2014 käyttöönotetun 
korkovähennysrajoituksen vaikutuksia monikansallisten yritysten 
käyttäytymiseen. Vertailemalla suomalaisia yrityksiä ruotsalaisiin ja tanskalaisiin 
vastaavanlaisiin yrityksiin havaitaan, että suomalaiset yritykset reagoivat 
rajoitukseen pienentämällä korkomenojaan kontrolliryhmään verrattuna. 
Tytäryhtiöt pienensivät myös pitkä-aikaisia velkojaan. Yritysten ei havaita 
korvanneen velan avulla tapahtuvaa voitonsiirtoa siirtohinnoittelulla. 
Korkovähennysrajoituksen ei myöskään havaita vaikuttaneen yritysten 
tuotantoon ja näin aiheuttaneen taloutta vääristäviä reaalitaloudellisia 
vaikutuksia. 
  
Asiasanat: yritysverotus, monikansalliset yritykset, pääomarakenne,  
korkovähennysrajoitus 
JEL-luokat: H25, H26, G32  
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that cross-country differences in corporate tax rates and tax
bases create opportunities for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to reduce their tax
burden (see e.g. Hines 1999, Devereux 2006, Dharmapala 2016). A critical feature of
the current international tax system is that the profits of each parent and subsidiary
are subject to corporate income taxation in its host country. This provides an
incentive for MNEs to alter the profit allocation between the parent company and the
subsidiaries in different countries. Substantial empirical evidence shows that MNEs
do indeed utilize these opportunities by engaging in various profit-shifting activities
(Huizinga and Laeven 2008, Buettner and Wamser 2013, Heckemeyer and Overesch
2013, Dharmapala 2014). According to the OECD (2015c), profit-shifting decreases
global corporate income tax revenue by 4-10%. In addition, it has distributional
effects as high-tax-rate and broad-tax-base countries lose tax revenues to low-tax
countries. Profit-shifting also distorts competition between MNEs and domestic
companies by giving an advantage to the former. One channel for profit-shifting is
via debt-shifting. This channel exploits the fact that interest expenses are deductible
for corporate tax purposes in most countries (see e.g. Huizinga et al. 2008). A
parent company in a high-tax country may show its profits in a low-tax country
by borrowing from its low-tax country subsidiary. Deducting the interest expenses
in a high-tax country and paying taxes on the corresponding interest income in a
low-tax country, the MNE effectively shifts its tax liability to the low-tax country
and reduces its overall tax burden.
As a response to diminished corporate tax revenues and to other adverse dis-
tortions, governments around the world have introduced several anti-tax avoidance
measures to protect their tax bases. The OECD has designed its Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) package to reduce the room for tax evasion and tax-planning
strategies that exploit gaps in the international tax system (OECD 2013a,b). The
package provides recommendations for actions that would equip governments with
the instruments needed to tackle profit-shifting. One of the recommendations fo-
cuses on limiting base erosion especially in cases involving interest deductions and
other financial payments (OECD 2015b). The European Commission (EC) has also
taken an active role in the fight against profit-shifting by including limitations in
deductibility of interest and other financial expenses both in the Anti-Tax Avoid-
ance Directive (ATAD) and in the directive on Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base (CCCTB). (EC 2016a,b,c)
In line with both the OECD recommendations and EC directives, Finland re-
stricted the deductibility of intra-MNE interest expenses from the beginning of 2014
onwards. In this paper, we study how this interest barrier (IB) affected the be-
havior of Finnish MNEs and succeeded in decreasing profit shifting. We employ
a difference-in-differences method to full population data of Finnish, Swedish and
Danish MNEs from the Orbis database. The Finnish MNEs are treated with the
IB, whereas the Swedish and Danish MNEs serve as a control group. We argue
that Swedish and Danish companies form a suitable control group, as the compa-
nies in the control and treatment groups show similar pre-reform trends in a number
of variables. Furthermore, the economic structures and institutions are relatively
similar in the three countries.1 In addition, we use an alternative control group of
companies of Finnish MNEs to show the robustness of our results.
Our paper is the first to study the effects of IB in case where no pre-reform
restrictions on the deductibility of interest expenses exist. The earlier empirical lit-
erature of an IB relies exclusively on the German reform, where a thin-capitalization
rule (TCR) was replaced by an IB. Our study is also the first to study the effects of
IB by using comparable MNEs from other countries as a control group.
We examine the effects of IB on financial expenses, debt levels and overall eco-
nomic activity of firms. Our results show that the introduction of the interest barrier
decreased the financial expenses of Finnish MNEs by 25-30%. This result is of im-
portance as it captures the joint changes in debt levels and their interest rates. We
also find a decrease in long-term debt levels. We do not find evidence of MNEs
increasing the use of other profit-shifting measures like transfer pricing in response
to the interest barrier. Neither do we find evidence of changes in real output among
Finnish MNEs compared to Swedish and Danish MNEs. As the output levels of the
treated companies are not affected, the interest barrier does not seem to distort the
overall activity of companies. The results suggest that an interest barrier can be an
efficient measure in tackling profit-shifting.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section reviews the related liter-
ature. Section 3 discusses the details of the Finnish reform and Section 4 provides
theoretical predictions of the effects of the reform. Section 5 describes the method-
ology and the data. The results of the econometric analyses are provided in Section
6 and Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This study contributes to the literature on profit-shifting by MNEs. The literature
has provided evidence of the occurrence of profit-shifting and acknowledges various
1For a comparison between the Finnish and Swedish economies, see Korkman and Suvanto
(2013).
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ways to shift profits (see e.g. Dharmapala 2014 and Egger and Stimmelmayr 2017).
The three most common ways are transfer pricing, debt-shifting and the use of intan-
gible assets. The literature also acknowledges multiple anti-tax avoidance measures
for tackling debt-shifting (see Webber 2010 for a survey). Typical measures include
thin-capitalization rules (TCRs), which restrict the debt-to-equity ratios of firms2,
and interest barriers (IB), which restrict the ratio of debt expenses to some profit-
related measure.3 Even if there has been a shift from the former to the latter, both
types of restrictions are applied in several countries (Merlo and Wamser 2014).
There is a large empirical literature on the effects of TCRs. Maßbaum and
Sureth (2009) study Belgian, Italian and German rules and find that their effects
depend significantly on the details of the underlying tax system. However, several
empirical studies on the effects of TCRs have shown that companies respond to
these rules in line with their objectives and reduce internal debt levels. Blouin et
al. (2014) investigate the impact of thin-capitalization rules on the capital structure
of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinationals in 54 countries and show that these
restrictions reduce an affiliate’s debt-to-asset ratio. Buettner et al. (2012) analyze
the impact of TCRs using a firm-level panel data set on the OECD country affiliates
of German multinationals. They find that TCRs reduce the incentive to use internal
loans for tax-planning but lead to higher external debt. A reduction in leverage is
also observed in a number of other studies (Weichenrieder and Windischbauer 2008,
Overesch and Wamser 2010 and Wamser 2014). In line with Buettner et al. (2012),
Wamser (2014) also provides evidence that internal debt might be easily substituted
by external debt. This may reduce the efficiency of TCRs that only restrict the use
of intra-company debt. The use of hybrid instruments further deteriorates the per-
formance of TCRs by providing a way to circumvent the restriction by manipulating
the label of the funding from debt to equity.4 In addition, these rules are shown to
have adverse effects on foreign direct investments in high-tax countries (Buettner et
al. 2014).5
2It is worth noting that debt-to-equity ratio restrictions (not only on internal debt, but in
general) may also have other objectives, like reducing systemic risk. Second, internal debt arrange-
ments also exist for purposes other than tax planning, and being able to substitute external debt
with internal debt offers MNEs several advantages relative to domestic firms (see Desai et al. 2004
and Egger et al. 2014). MNEs are, for instance, able to issue external debt in a favorable credit
market to affiliates in less favorable markets.
3A typically used profit-related measure is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization, EBITDA.
4Hybrid instruments, which have elements of both debt and equity, are considered to be prob-
lematic for both TCRs and IBs by reducing their effectiveness (Barnes 2015). Action 2 in the
OECD action plan tries to tackle the problems related to hybrid instruments. (OECD 2015a)
5Debt-equity tax bias relates to the fact that debt is deducted in corporate taxation in many
countries, whereas equity is not, leading to tax favoritism of debt compared to equity. This bias
results in excess debt, which has been observed not only to exacerbate tax avoidance opportunities
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A recent evolution of the anti-tax avoidance measures targeted to reducing the
scope for debt-shifting has been towards IBs. By restricting the deductibility of
interest expenses related to profits, they are often tighter for firms with low profits
than the TCRs. Therefore, compared to TCRs, substitution between internal and
external debt may not play such a big role in the case of IBs. Gresik et al. (2017)
show theoretically that from a welfare perspective TCRs are under certain assump-
tions inferior to IBs.6 They also discuss about the use of IBs emerging because of
the perception that TCRs are inefficient. The effects of IBs have previously been
studied in a German context.7 Buslei and Simmler (2012), Dressler and Scheuering
(2012) and Alberternst and Sureth-Sloane (2016) study the impacts of the introduc-
tion of an interest barrier (IB) that constituted an upper bound for the deductibility
of debt expenses in Germany from 2008 onwards.8 Buslei and Simmler (2012) show
that firms responded to the IB by decreasing their debt-equity ratio or by splitting
their assets to avoid the exemption limit, and the IB increased the tax base for
firms that did not respond. Dressler and Scheuering (2012) find that firms reacted
to the reform by reducing their debt-to-asset ratio and net interest payments. They
also find unintended effects that are contrary to the purpose of the IB as domestic
companies also reduced their debt-to-asset ratios. Furthermore, companies mostly
reduced their external, not internal, debt. Alberternst and Sureth-Sloane (2016)
find that affected companies reduced their leverage by as much as 4.7 percentage
points more than non-affected companies.
Our study also contributes to the broader question of the relationship between
taxes and the financing structure of companies. It has been found that a higher
marginal tax rate is associated with a higher debt ratio (MacKieMason 1990, Givoly
et al. 1992, Graham 1996, Sarkar and Zapatero 2003 and Stöckl and Winner 2013).
However, some studies have also found evidence of a negative relationship between
the marginal tax rate and the debt ratio (Barclay and Smith 1995, Ayers et al.
via debt-shifting, but also via increasing systemic risk by increasing riskiness and therefore the
probabilities of company bankruptcies. The welfare impacts of debt-equity tax bias may be large,
perhaps more than 0.25% of GDP (see de Mooij 2011 and Fatica et al. 2012). Another way to
tackle the problem of systemic risk is by decreasing tax rates, as these are observed to reduce the
leverage of companies (see e.g. Miniaci et al. 2014 and Dwenger and Steiner 2014).
6They use the term earnings stripping rule instead of IB and the safe harbor rule to denote a
deductibility restriction that is related to the limit for debt-equity ratio.
7A review of empirical evidence of German TCRs and IBs is provided by Ruf and Schindler
(2015).
8In this reform Germany replaced its TCR by IB. Under the new rules net interest expenses
are always fully deductible only if these do not exceed both 30% of EBITDA and €3M. Otherwise
deductibility is restricted, unless at least one of the conditions called “escape clauses” holds. Figure
1 in Dressler and Scheuering (2012) provides an illustrative description of how the escape clauses
work. For example, the deductibility of interest expenses is not restricted if the company’s equity
ratio does not exceed the equity ratio of the whole group. This restriction is independent of the
creditor. (Buslei and Simmler 2012)
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2001 and Huang and Ritter 2009). Buettner et al. (2009) investigate the effects of
company taxation and capital market conditions on the financial structure of MNE’s
foreign affiliates and find that a higher local tax rate is positively associated with
internal debt. Buettner et al. (2011) find that local tax rates have a positive effect
on both internal and external debt. Feld et al. (2013) provide a meta-analysis of
capital structure choices and company taxation.
3 The Finnish Reform
Interest expenses related to business income were largely deductible in Finland un-
til 2013. The Finnish reform of 2014 constitutes a restriction on the deductibility
of net interest expenses relative to the adjusted taxable result of business income,
i.e. the taxable profits adjusted for tax purposes.9 However, even if the reform
was introduced for 2014 the MNEs may anticipate it already before. The govern-
ment proposal (146/2012) announced the forthcoming reform in November 2012 and
therefore there may occur a response already from that year on.
The provision applies to Finnish companies and partnerships and to foreign
companies permanently established in Finland. It is applied at the level of individual
companies and concerns only the interest expenses of intra-group loans and loans
between related parties.10
The law aims to limit the scope for intra-company debt-shifting.11 The gov-
ernment proposal (185/2013) estimated that the reform would lead to increase in
corporate tax revenue of about 2%.12
9In line with the objectives of the BEPS project, Finland introduced an interest barrier to
protect its tax base in the beginning of 2014. The restriction was introduced in 2013, but due
to a one-year transition period it was applied for the first time in 2014. The interest deduction
limitation is part of the Business Income Tax Act (§ 18 a). Even though interest expenses have
been largely deductible, in some special cases such as in the presence of tax evasion (see the Act
on Assessment Procedure 18.12.1995/1558; § 28) or transfer pricing (see the Act on Assessment
Procedure 18.12.1995/1558; § 31), the deductibility of interest expenses may already have been
restricted before 2014.
10The related party definition used in provision § 18 a in the Business Income Tax Act is
connected to the actual control (based e.g. on share ownership, voting power) defined in the
Act on Assessment Procedure (18.12.1995/1558, § 31 Transfer pricing adjustment).
11The details and the underlying reasons are given in the Business Income Tax Act (24.6.1968:
§ 18 a; 28.12.983; 30.12.2013) and in Government proposals 146/2012 and 185/2013. The Govern-
ment proposal (146/2012) also suggests that the Tax Administration should monitor the effects
of the introduction of the interest deduction restrictions. The finance committee memorandum
(31/2012) and the parliament reply (156/2012) state that the Ministry of Finance and the Tax
Administration should monitor the effects of the tax changes on the finance structures of compa-
nies and on changes in interest expense deductions and examine potential new tax planning issues
arising.
12The corporate income is budgeted to bring in a total of €3.861 billion in tax revenue in 2014
(Budget Proposal 2014). The interest deductibility restriction is calculated to increase tax revenue
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Figure 1 illustrates the somewhat complicated structure of the Finnish interest
barrier by employing five questions (Q1-Q5). If the answers to the first four questions
are positive, the deductibility restriction is applied. The first question (Q1) asks
whether the interest expenses exceed the interest income of the firm. As long as
interest expenses do not exceed interest income, all interest expenses are deductible.
If interest expenses do exceed interest income, net interest expenses are still fully
deductible as long as they do not exceed €500,000 (Q2).
If net interest expenses exceed the limit of €500,000, net interest expenses are
still deductible if they are at most 25% of the adjusted taxable result of business
income13 (Q3).
Even if all the answers to Q1-Q3 are positive, interest expenses are still fully
deductible as long as the equity ratio of the consolidated group does not exceed
the equity ratio of the company (Q4; escape clause 1). If this is not the case, the
deductibility of interest expenses will be restricted by the new provision.
Question Q5 considers the amount of net interest expenses that are not de-
ductible. Non-deductibility is restricted to the amount of net interest expenses
arising from the related parties. More specifically, all net interest expenses exceed-
ing 25% of the adjusted taxable result of business income will be non-deductible as
long as they do not exceed the net intra-group interest expenses of the debt par-
ties. If they exceed net intra-group interest expenses, the exceeding part will remain
deductible.
In addition to the equity ratio rule explained above, the provision also includes
a second escape clause (escape clause 2; not shown in figure) which states that
the restriction is not applied to credit institutions, insurance companies, pension
institutions and in some cases to their consolidated corporations. The provision
also states that non-deductible interest may be carried forward and may therefore
be deducted in future years.14
Let us next illustrate the changes in the incentives arising from the introduction
of the Finnish IB. For now let us consider the case where neither of the two escape
clauses are binding and the answer to Q5 is “NO”. The upper graphs of Figure 2
from corporate income taxes by €80M, which is roughly 2% of the total corporate income tax in
the budget (Government proposals 146/2012 and 185/2013). The Finnish corporate tax rate has
been 26% from 2005 to 2011, 24.5% form 2012 to 2013 and 20% from 2014 on.
13The adjusted taxable result of business income refers to a company’s taxable profit plus interest
expenses and depreciations deducted for tax purposes (EBITD). The Finnish group contribution
(given is added and received is deducted) is also taken into account when calculating the adjusted
taxable result. Technically the adjusted taxable result is calculated here by adding amortizations
to and subtracting net group subsidies from EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation
and Amortization).
14The ability of a company to benefit from non-deductible interest carried forward depends on
whether the company makes profits in the future.
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Figure 2: Before and after the reform incentives
describe this case before and after the reform. Before the reform (upper left graph
of Figure 2), there are two cases. First, net interest expenses are fully deductible in
cases where the adjusted taxable result exceeds net interest expenses (shaded area).
The tax benefit of a firm increases as deductible interest expenses lower taxable
corporate income and thus also decrease the corporate tax burden. Second, in cases
where net interest expenses exceed the adjusted taxable result, all of the adjusted
taxable result can be deducted. These cases result in zero taxation for the company
and the amount of the benefit is the corporate tax rate times the adjusted taxable
result.
The upper right-hand graph illustrates the deductibility of interest expenses after
the reform. The tax treatment of companies whose net interest expenses are at most
€500,000 remains unaffected. For these companies the amount of the deduction is the
minimum of the adjusted taxable result and net interest expenses. The implications
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of the reform for companies whose net interest expenses exceed €500,000 depend
on the relative magnitudes of the net interest expenses and the adjusted taxable
result. In some cases the reform has an effect on company interest deductibility,
whereas in others there are no changes. For a company with net interest expenses
over €500,000, but still in the dark gray shaded area (e.g. a company with an
adjusted taxable result of €3M and net interest expenses of €600,000; point A in
the graph), the reform does not change the deductibility, because its net interest
expenses do not exceed one quarter of the adjusted taxable result. For a company
with an adjusted taxable result of €1M and net interest expenses of €600,000 (point
B), the reform decreases the deduction by more than one half (from pre-reform
€600,000 to post-reform €250,000). Companies with little income and net interest
payments above €500,000 are affected the most. For instance, a company with an
adjusted taxable result of €500,000 and net interest expenses of €600,000 (point C)
is allowed to deduct only €125,000 after the reform, which is only a quarter of what
it was before the reform (€500,000).
The lower left-hand graph of Figure 2 illustrates the magnitudes of the reductions
in the deductibility of interest expenses. For a company with net interest expenses
less than €500,000 or less than 25% of its adjusted taxable result, there are no
changes in the deductibility (white area). For companies in the light gray area, the
interest deduction is reduced, but by less than 25%. For the gray area the reduction
is at least 25%, but less than 50%. For the dark gray area, the reduction is between
50% and 75%. The biggest reduction is 75% (black area). The pattern is clear: of
those companies that face a reduction in their deductibility at all, the reduction is
typically higher the smaller the adjusted taxable result is. Thus the IB affects most
those companies with relatively little profits, but a lot of net interest expenses.15
The lower right-hand graph illustrates cases where a company considers increas-
ing its net interest expenses by a small amount. It shows that companies with
low profits have the sharpest incentives not to increase their debt level. Consider
a company with net interest expenses of €500,000 and an adjusted taxable result
of €500,000, whose net interest expenses are fully deductible. Suppose next what
happens when it borrows an additional €1 after the reform. Because net interest
expenses exceed €500,000, the maximum amount that can be deducted is only 1/4
of the adjusted taxable result, resulting in a deduction of €125,000 (€375,000 less
than without the additional loan of €1). With a 20% corporate income tax rate,
the change corresponds to the marginal cost of the additional €1 loan being €75,000
(which is 7.5 million per cent of the additional loan). Thus, in some cases the inter-
est deductibility restriction provides a very sharp incentive for companies to change
15We study the effects also with respect to the intensity of the treatment in Section 6.1.
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their behavior in response to the reform.
4 Theoretical predictions
In the following simple theoretical framework we assume that MNEs maximize their
joint group level net-of-tax profits. In the absence of interest deductibility restric-
tions the MNE may choose to use debt-shifting to achieve its objective. This may
be done by changing either the internal debt level or the corresponding interest rate,
or both. Below we first consider a case where there are no restrictions on interest
deductibility. Following this case we consider the changes in MNE incentives aris-
ing when the government introduces a restriction on the deductibility of interest
expenses.
Let us consider two companies that belong to the same MNE, but are located in
two different countries. A domestic company h (e.g. parent) is located in a high-tax
country H and a foreign company l (subsidiary) is located in a low-tax country L.
The corporate tax rate of country H exceeds that of country L (τH > τL). Equation
(1) gives the net-of-tax profits (ΠDS) in a case where all interest expenses are fully
deductible and company l issues a loan of size D with an interest rate r to company
h.
ΠDS = (piH − TH) + (piL − TL) = piH − τH(piH − rD) + piL − τL(piL + rD) =
= (1− τH) piH + τHrD + (1− τL) piL − τLrD =
= (1− τH) piH + (1− τL) piL + (τH − τL)rD = ΠnoDS + (τH − τL) rD
(1)
Company h deducts its interest expenses rD from its pre-tax profit piH and
company l receives rD in interest payments, which becomes subject to the corporate
tax rate τL. TH and TL are the taxes paid in countries H and L respectively. Here
the company has two ways to affect its interest expenses, by changing either the debt
level D or its interest rate r (or both). However, independently of which of these
two ways is used, the net-of-tax profits of the MNE become higher than without
debt-shifting (∏DS > ∏noDS).16 Thus, if the interest expenses are fully deductible
for corporate tax purposes in country H, the MNE may increase its net-of-tax profits
by showing additional profits in country L. It should also be noted that internal
debts are not only used for profit-shifting purposes but can be (and also typically
are) used to finance investments and production. In such a case company profits piH
16In case the companies act independently, the net-of-tax profits of the MNE, Π, are
Π = (1− τH)piH + (1− τL)piL := ΠnoDS .
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and piL could be functions of D. In any case, if debt-shifting is feasible, companies
can increase their joint profit by increasing their interest expenses (rD).
Let us next consider what happens when the government introduces a restriction
on the deductibility of interest expenses (IB) in country H. More specifically, let a
fraction a (0 ≤ a < 1) of interest expenses rD be deductible for tax purposes. Note
that the smaller the parameter a is the tighter the restriction is. In this case the
MNE net-of-tax profit is
ΠIB = (piH − TH) + (piL − TL) = piH − τH(piH − arD) + piL − τL(piL + rD) =
= (1− τH)piH + τHarD + (1− τL) piL − τLrD =
= (1− τH) piH + (1− τL)piL + (aτH − τL)rD = ΠnoDS + (aτH − τL) rD
(2)
A comparison of equations 1 and 2 shows that introducing an IB reduces the in-
centives for debt-shifting. Without an interest barrier a one-unit increase in interest
expenses (rD) from the high-tax country to low-tax country increases the net-of-tax
profits of the MNE by τH − τL. With an interest barrier the corresponding change
in the net-of-tax profits following from one-unit debt-shifting is aτH − τL, which is
always smaller than without an interest barrier (aτH − τL < τH − τL). It should be
noted that there is no incentive to use debt-shifting if τL > aτH . Even when this is
not the case, an interest barrier makes debt-shifting less lucrative from the MNE’s
point of view and is therefore likely to reduce such activity. Thus, according to our
simple model the hypothesis regarding interest expenses is that they will decrease
among companies that are affected by the IB. Let us formulate this as our first
hypothesis:17
H1: The financial expenses of affected companies decrease
As discussed above, financial expenses depend on the debt level D and the interest
rate r. Therefore, the MNE may reduce its financial expenses by changing one
of these components or alternatively partly reduce internal debt levels and interest
rates. As there are restrictions on how high an interest rate can be, the debt response
is also likely to occur. Our second testable hypothesis reads as follows:
H2: The debt levels of affected companies decrease
Because short-term debts are more often used for everyday transactions, we consider
that especially long-term debt levels will change. Our third and fourth hypothesis
17We formulate this hypothesis for the financial expenses (instead of interest expenses), because
these are what we see in our data and what we will test empirically in Section 6.
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considers the reactions in long-term and short-term debt levels following the intro-
duction of an interest barrier.
H3: The long-term debt levels of affected companies decrease
H4: The short-term debt levels of affected companies do not change
The interest barrier cuts the incentives for profit-shifting via debt-shifting by in-
creasing its costs. However, the possibilities to employ other profit-shifting channels
are mostly not changed. So affected companies may have an incentive to increase
transfer pricing activities.18 Empirically this would be seen in EBITDA.
H5: Debt-shifting by affected companies is replaced by transfer pricing
As a by-product, the IB may also make internal funding for investment more costly
and increase the cost of capital as the company has to find funding from third party
at a higher price. This might lead to decreased investment and affect for instance
the turnover of the company.19 This is our last primary hypothesis.
H6: Real output decreases among affected companies
In addition to our primary hypotheses (H1 - H6), the theoretical model also provides
other predictions (H7 - H10). First, as long as treated companies do not replace
debt-shifting completely by transfer pricing and other debt-shifting methods, both
the profits and taxes paid by the companies should increase. The data do not have
a measure for taxable profits but we can examine changes in the amount of annual
taxes paid by firms (H7).
H7: Taxes paid by affected companies increase
Further, changes should occur in other companies of affected MNEs. We expect the
financial revenues and taxes paid by these companies to decrease (H8 - H9).
H8: The financial revenues of non-affected companies in affected MNEs de-
crease
18It is worth noting that the extent to which debt-shifting is replaced by transfer pricing is
probably not one-to-one, but depends on different things. A key determinant is the pre-reform
relative price of each of the profit-shifting channels for the company. If the company has exercised
profit-shifting only via transfer pricing before the reform (because it is more lucrative for the
company), it is not likely to change the behavior. However, those companies that have exercised
debt-shifting before the reform are more likely to have been provided with the incentives to change
their behavior, because of the increased price of this activity.
19We do agree that materialization of the turnover reductions following the reduced investments
might take a longer time than the time span of our data. Therefore, observing no changes in the
turnover does not provide exhaustive evidence on there not being any real responses.
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H9: The taxes of non-affected companies in affected MNEs decrease
Our model also shows that fractiona in equation 2, the fraction of interest expenses
that is deductible after the reform, matters for the incentives. The smaller the
parametera for a given company, the more intensively the reform changes its incen-
tives. This consideration lead to our final hypothesis (H10).
H10: The intensity of the reform matters for company responses
5 Methods and data
5.1 Difference-in-Differences
We apply a standard difference-in-differences (DD) method to estimate the effects
of the Finnish interest barrier on several behavioral margins of companies. The
definitions and constructions of the treatment and control groups are discussed in
the next subsection.
We estimate the following equation
Log(Yit) = θcontrolsit + β1treati + β2anticipationt + β3aftert+
.
+β4treati ∗ anticipationt + β5treati ∗ aftert + ηi + εit, (3)
where Y refers to the dependent variable of interest for firm i at time t. The
dependent variables are all in a logarithmic form to deal with the skewed outcomes.
The variable treati is a dummy variable which indicates whether an observation
belongs to the treatment group or not. It gets value one if the firm belongs to
the treatment group and is zero otherwise. The variable anticipationt is a time
dummy for the observation to be from years 2012 and 2013. The variable aftert is
a time dummy which gets value one if an observation comes from some year after
2014 and zero otherwise. In some specifications we also replace anticipationt and
aftert by year dummies to investigate the yearly responses. In the baseline analysis,
controlsit include the number of employees and sales in natural logarithmic form.
ηi is a firm-specific constant term and εit is an i.i.d. error term.
The main interest lies in coefficients β4 and β5 (the coefficients for the interaction
terms treati ∗ anticipationt and treati ∗ aftert). Each of these coefficients shows
the impact of the introduction of the interest barrier on treated firms relative to the
control group (average treatment effect for the treated, ATT), if the DD assumptions
hold. The main assumption of the DDmethod is the common time trend assumption,
which means that the variable of interest would behave similarly in the treatment
13
and control groups over time if the policy change had not been introduced.20 In
our baseline analysis, we use a firm fixed-effect strategy that allows for correlation
between the firm component (ηi) and the regressors.
5.2 Defining the treatment and control groups
Our data come from the ORBIS database produced by Bureau van Dijk. The
database provides data on firms’ financial and productive factors from balance sheets
and income statements as well as detailed information on firms’ domestic and inter-
national ownership structure for companies across the world. 21 To study the effects
of the Finnish interest barrier, we collected 113,687 observations on Finnish MNEs
and their subsidiaries and 540,477 observations on Swedish and Danish MNEs and
their subsidiaries between the years 2009 and 2015.22 The interest deductibility
has been restricted in Sweden and Denmark for this whole period. These restric-
tions have also remained largely unchanged in both countries, making their MNEs
appropriate for our control group.23
We construct our treatment group from those companies that are likely to be
affected by the reform. More specifically, a company belongs to the treatment group
if it belongs to a Finnish MNE and its deductibility of interest expenses would have
been affected by the Finnish IB in at least one year between 2009 and 2013. The
control group is constructed according to the same criterion from the companies
of Swedish and Danish MNEs. The construction of both the treatment group and
20The method also requires that there is no self-selection to the groups and no differences in
transitory shocks during the examination. Additionally, one has to assume that the error term is
not correlated with the regressors and there is no perfect multicollinearity between regressors .
21The ORBIS database is discussed in more detail in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015).
22The data include companies that have at least one foreign subsidiary. The corresponding
numbers for years 2009-2013, which are employed in the derivation of the treatment and control
groups, are 81,205 and 386,055 (see Table 1). Our data are collected between 10/2016-3/2017.
23Sweden introduced interest deduction rules for internal loans that were associated with internal
acquisitions in 2009. In 2013 these rules were extended to apply to interest expenses on all debts
within a specially defined group. Regarding our empirical results provided in the following section
the tightening of the Swedish interest limitation rule implies that our estimates become the lower
bounds for the effect. The Danish interest deductibility limitation is composed of three sets of
rules: thin-capitalization rules, the interest ceiling rule and the EBIT rule. The thin-capitalization
rule works to disallow gross interest costs and capital losses on related company debt to the extent
the overall debt-to-equity ratio exceeds a given ratio (safe harbor). In relation to financing costs
that remain after the thin-capitalization limitation, there is an interest ceiling rule that limits the
deductibility further by introducing an upper bound via fixed relation to the company assets. The
EBIT rule, which is applied after the thin-capitalization rule and the interest ceiling rule, limits
the tax deductibility of net financing costs and is determined via fixed relation to EBIT. The last
of the three rules was introduced in 2007. Therefore, the interest deductibility restrictions have
been remained largely unchanged in Sweden and Denmark between 2009 and 2015. Note also that
we use other control groups than Swedish and Danish MNEs to study the robustness of our results
in Section 6.2.
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the control group is illustrated in Table 1. The upper panel of the table describes
it for companies that belong to Finnish MNEs (treatment group) and the lower
panel for companies in Swedish and Danish MNEs (control group). Let us consider
the upper panel. It shows that only relatively few (2.8%) of all the observations
from Finnish MNEs exceed both the euro and the profit limits.24 Due to the escape
clauses (equity ratio, industry), not all of these observations would have been affected
by the reform.25 For 1,164 observations, neither of the escape clauses is binding,
yet both the euro limit and the profit-related limit are exceeded. These are the
observations that would have faced different tax treatment due to the reform.26
These observations come from 520 companies that belong to Finnish MNEs. As
our treatment group includes those companies that would have been affected by
the reform at least once in years 2009-2013 (had the reform been in place), these
520 companies are our treatment group. Of these 520 companies, 25 are ultimate
parents and the rest have subsidiary status. The control group is constructed in
exactly the same way as the treatment group.27
The descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups are provided for
years 2009-2011 in Table 2. According to the table, Finnish firms that were affected
by the reform (treatment) are larger in terms of annual turnover and employees than
the firms in the control group. Regarding debt levels we would like to observe the
internal debts, but unfortunately we can only see the sum of internal and external
debts. Similarly, regarding financial expenses we cannot distinguish those arising
due to internal debts from the ones arising due to external debts. According to
the table there are no large differences in these variables between treatment and
control groups. The same holds for EBITDA. However, it seems that the firms in
24If neither of the escape clauses is binding, there would have been a change in deductibility for
those observations whose net interest expenses exceed both €500,000 and 25% of adjusted profits.
There are 2,289 observations for Finnish MNEs in our data that exceed both of these limits in the
pre-reform period from 2009 to 2013 (2289 / 81205 = 2.8%). Note that here we do not take into
account the carry-forward property of the deductions. Note also that because a lot of observations,
especially on amortizations and net group support (variable Extr. and Other P/L), are missing
(although these are more likely to be really zeros than missing) and we do not want to compress
the number of observations, we have replaced the missing values by zeros here when considering
the treatment group.
25The first escape clause compares the equity ratio of the company to the corresponding ratio
for the whole group. The ratio is calculated as follows: Ratio = (Total Asset - Debt)/Total Asset.
26Here it is also worth noting that the restriction stands for net interest expenses between
companies with interconnections (MNEs). Our data allow us to observe only the overall net
interest expenses.
27The control group consists of companies of Swedish and Danish MNEs that would have been
affected by the Finnish reform at least once between 2009 and 2013 had the reform been applied
to them. According to the lower panel of Table 1, there are 5,657 observations that exceed both
the euro limit and the profit limit. For 2,715 (48.0%) of these observations neither of the escape
clauses is binding. These observations come from 1,205 companies of Swedish and Danish MNEs.
Of these 30 are ultimate parents and the rest have subsidiary status.
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the treatment groups pay substantially less corporate taxes than the control group.
5.3 Descriptive analysis
In this section we depict time series of central variables for firms in the treatment
and control groups. The aim is twofold. First, we want to show that the common
time trend assumption holds as the variables show similar pre-reform trends in
both the treatment and control groups. Second, examining a time series visually
gives us descriptive evidence on the effects following the announcement and the
implementation of the reform.
Figure 3 depicts the time trends of the natural logarithm of financial expenses,
overall debt, long-term debt, short-term debt, EBITDA and annual turnover for
treatment and control group observations. In the upper panel of each graph we
show the development of a given variable separately for the two groups. In the lower
panel we show the development of the difference between the groups. 95% confidence
intervals are depicted in both panels. The annual differences are calculated from
coefficients of year indicators in a firm fixed-effect regression where the dependent
variable is the corresponding time series variable. It seems that all the selected
variables develop rather similarly over time in both groups. Debt levels in particular
show almost identical pre-reform time trends.
The trends in financial expenses and long-term debt levels differ between the
treatment and control groups after the policy is introduced as the values for the
treatment group decrease compared to the control group.28 The time trend for short-
term debt does not show as clear a time trend as that for long-term debt. EBITDA
and turnover also show rather similar pre-reform time trends. To conclude, the pre-
reform trends among companies of Finnish MNEs and those of other Nordic MNEs
are quite similar. However, as can be seen from the depicted confidence intervals,
the standard errors are large. This is understandable as the Finnish interest barrier
affects rather large firms and thus the number of observation is relatively small.
We are also able to use an alternative control group that consist of companies
of Finnish MNEs that were not affected by the reform. More specifically, we use
28Note that there is no difference between treatment and control groups in financial expenses in
2015. We observe from the data that the financial expenses of Swedish MNEs especially decrease
compared to Finnish MNEs in 2015. The behavior of Swedish MNEs is likely to be a response to
conflicting interpretations of interest deductibility rules between Swedish Tax Agency and MNEs.
This induced several appeals to the Administrative Court as the Swedish Tax Agency denied large
amounts of interest deductibility of MNEs in 2015 (see, e.g. PwC 2016 and Bloomberg 2017). One
potential reason for different interpretations arises from the question about whether the Swedish
interest deduction limitation rules were contrary to EC law. This has also produced an intense
debate of the applicability of the restrictions on interest deductibility in Sweden (see, e.g. EY
2014).
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Figure 3: Development of logs of financial expenses, overall debt, long-term debt,
short-term debt, EBITDA and turnover of companies of Finnish MNEs (Treatment)
and of Swedish and Danish MNEs (Control)
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all companies of Finnish MNEs that had net interest expenses less than 25% of the
adjusted taxable result of business income and less than 500,000 euros of net interest
expenses prior to the reform as an alternative comparison group. Figure 4 shows
the development of financial expenses and long-term debts for the treatment group
and the alternative control group (Control 2). The main message from the Figure is
very similar to the baseline comparison presented in Figure 3: the pre-reform trends
follow each other very closely and the trends start to diverge for both outcomes from
2012 onwards.29 This offers us an opportunity to use alternative control group to
study the effects of the introduction of an IB in Finland and also gives us further
evidence that the reform clearly affected the behavior of treated MNEs. In Section
6.2 we also estimate the effects of the reform on all our main hypotheses (H1-H7)
using this alternative control group and show that the results are very well in line
with our baseline results.
Figure 4: Development of logs of financial expenses and long-term debt of companies
of Finnish MNEs (Treatment) and alternative control group of companies of Finnish
MNEs that were not affected by the reform (Control 2)
6 Results
This section presents our econometric results. Section 6.1 first presents our main
results and then studies the effects in more detail by studying whether the results
differ by the intensity of the treatment (IB). Section 6.2 provides robustness checks
for our results.
29In Figure 5 in the Appendix we also present the development of overall debt, short-term debt,
EBITDA and annual turnover over time to show that the pre-trends are very similar also in these
variables across the groups.
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6.1 Main Results
Table 3 shows the estimation results obtained by fitting the DD model described
in Section 5 to a full sample of firms where parent companies and subsidiaries are
pooled together. Each column presents results for a model with a different dependent
variable, each of these being in logarithmic form. According to the first hypothesis,
H1, financial expenses are predicted to decrease among treated companies after the
interest barrier is introduced. The first column in the table tests this hypothesis. The
regression considers two DD estimates (DD 1 and DD 2).30 The first of these stands
for the anticipation effect (2012-2013), which took place immediately after the law
was announced, but before it was applied. The DD coefficient for the anticipation
effect is negative (-0.302) and highly statistically significant and shows that there is
a response to the interest barrier already before 2014 when it was first applied. This
is likely to arise due to MNEs starting to change their behavior towards the long-run
optimum right after the reform was announced, instead of waiting an additional year
or two. An underlying issue might thus relate to debt decisions inside the MNEs
being made in discrete intervals, instead of being updated in short time periods.
Fama and Fresch (2002) also observe that MNEs adjust their debts slowly.
The effect of the interest barrier on financial expenses is very similar for the
years after the law came into force (2014-2015). Following the introduction of the
interest barrier the financial expenses of the companies belonging to Finnish MNEs
decreased by roughly a quarter compared to the control group. The results, which
are in line with our hypothesis H1, are also observed in Figure 3. The reduction in
financial expenses might arise from changes in debt levels (D), their interest rates
(r) or in financial expenses other than interest expenses. As interest rates and other
financial expenses are unobserved, we next study debt levels.
The following three columns in Table 3 stand for the DD results for overall
debt levels, long-term debt levels and short-term debt levels, respectively. For none
of the debt levels do we find statistically significant changes. The results suggest
that factors other than debt levels might play a role in the decreases in financial
expenses. One way for MNEs is to affect the interest rates of within-group loans
that would mechanically decrease financial expenses, but won’t affect the debt levels.
Regarding the results for debt it is also worth noting the large standard errors in
the results regarding long-term debt, which follow from the large number of missing
observations in this variable.
Table 3 considers also other than directly debt-related responses to the interest
barrier. The following two columns in the table stand for the DD results for EBITDA
30Because we employ a fixed-effects model, there is no separate constant for the treatment
variable.
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and turnover. As the interest barrier makes debt-shifting less attractive, firms might
resort increasingly to transfer pricing to shift profits. If there were such a change
in profit-shifting, which would change it from debt-shifting towards transfer pricing,
we should observe this by considering the changes in EBITDA. However, according
to the results no such change happened. Therefore, our results do not support the
hypothesis that firms reacted to the interest barrier by resorting increasingly to
transfer pricing as a means of shifting profits. Of course, the firms may have also
other means to affect their tax liabilities. These include decisions concerning location
of offices and intellectual property, group structure and use of holding companies.
The changes in EBITDA could track also other than transfer pricing margins, but
detailed information on changes in the group structure and internal transactions of
MNEs would be needed to observe whether companies react to the IB by increasing
the use of other methods. To our best knowledge, no such data is available.
In addition to profit-shifting responses, the interest barrier might have real re-
sponses. An indication of such responses might be observed in turnover. However,
the results for turnover do not support the existence of real responses, as all the DD
estimates remain statistically insignificant in the second last column.
A potential caveat is that the real responses could materialize over longer time
period. However, our results show that treated firms responded to the IB already
before the reform, but their turnover did not change, suggesting no real responses
within observed 4 years since the IB was first discussed.
We can further investigate this by studying whether or not the interest barrier
affected the amount of corporate taxes reported to Finland by Finnish MNEs (H7).
If the reform affected the profit-shifting margin only, we should observe an increase
in the level of corporate taxes among treated firms after the reform. The last column
of Table 3 shows the results. It seems that the DD point estimates are positive which
would suggest an increase in the amount of taxes as in our hypothesis, but these
estimates are clearly not statistically significant. On one hand, the reduction in the
corporate tax rate in 2014 suggests that the point estimate would be a lower bound
and may therefore become statistically non-significant. On the other hand, the tax
rate reduction might reduce incentive for debt-shifting. Therefore, we cannot provide
firm evidence that the interest barrier succeeded in reducing all the profit-shifting
channels of Finnish MNEs. However, the positive DD estimates for corporate taxes
together with DD estimates for EBITDA very close to zero suggest behavior in line
with the original goals of the reform.
As the amount of financial expenses decreases among treated MNEs, the amount
of financial revenues should also symmetrically decrease among other subsidiaries of
MNEs that are part of treated MNEs (compared to the control group) if intra-MNE
23
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tax avoidance by debt-shifting was blocked by the Finnish reform (H8). By other
subsidiaries we mean firms that belong to the treated MNEs but are not located
in Finland. To offer credible estimates we use firms that belong to the control
MNEs but that are not located in Denmark or Sweden as a comparison group. The
decrease in financial revenue would also imply a decrease in profits among these other
subsidiaries. We test both of these hypotheses in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.
However, as mentioned before, we do not have a direct measure of corporate profits
so we use corporate taxes as a proxy for this (H9). We observe a clear decrease in
financial revenue among other firms belonging to the treated MNEs compared to the
control group (in column (1)). This offers distinct evidence that the introduction of
the Finnish interest barrier prevents internal debt-shifting within MNEs. Also, as
expected the point estimates for both the anticipation and after period for corporate
taxes are negative, although these estimates are not statistically significant. This
may be because of other issues affecting the corporate taxes. For example changes
in corporate tax rates may affect corporate tax revenues.
We also study the possible differences in responses to the interest barrier between
parent companies and their subsidiaries regarding hypothesis H1 - H7. In these
regressions, provided in Table 7 in the Appendix we interact the DD variable with
a dummy variable for having parent status. The results show that a decrease in
financial expenses (H1) takes place both for parent companies and for subsidiaries.
Separating parents from their subsidiaries in the table reveals that there is a long-
term debt response to the reform among subsidiaries, something which was masked
in Table 3. The result provides support for hypothesis H3 by showing that the
long-term debt levels of subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs decrease after the reform. For
parents the coefficient is positive yet statistically not significant. Yet, the results
provide some evidence pointing towards parents being able to manipulate with the
interest rate instead of debt levels. Regarding other hypotheses tested in Table 7,
the estimates seem to be consistently statistically insignificantly different from zero
as they are in the baseline results.
Finally, we study whether the responses to the Finnish IB differ according to the
intensity of the treatment. Our hypothesis (H10) arising from the theoretical model
is that the response is larger among those companies whose interest deductibility is
restricted the most.
The intensity of the reform was illustrated in the lower left-hand side graph of
Figure 2 in Section 3. As suggested by the graph, we consider a company to have an
intense treatment if its deductibility of net interest expenses was reduced by 75% due
to the reform. The number of these firms is only 121 out of all 520 treated companies.
The treatment and control groups are constructed as in the previous section. For
25
the regressions we added a dummy variable to indicate the high-intensity treatment
to separate the effect for them from the overall response. The results for treatment
intensity are provided in Table 8 in the Appendix. The results support hypothesis
H10 for financial expenses.31 The reduction in financial expenses is greater among
those companies for which treatment was the most intensive. For other variables we
do not find differences with respect to intensity of treatment. This may be either
because there are no differences or due to reduced power following from the splitting
of data in these regressions. Despite of reduced power, we still find some evidence
on the intensity of treatment affecting the firm behavior.32
6.2 Robustness Checks
As already discussed in Section 3, the Finnish IB applies not only to Finnish com-
panies but also to foreign companies permanently established in Finland. As a
robustness check for our main results, in this section we study those companies that
are located in Finland and are part of a MNE. In this robustness check, the treat-
ment group is constructed according to the same criteria as for the main results, but
now this group contains all companies that are located in Finland and are part of
a multinational group. Therefore, this group is formed independently of the MNEs’
parent country and without restricting the sample according to escape clause 1,
which we are not able to apply without information on the entire MNE’s aggregated
equity ratio. Note also that we cannot calculate the group-level clustered standard
errors. The control group contains a similarly constructed population of Swedish
and Danish firms.
Table 5 shows the results. The estimates are well in line with the baseline
results presented in Table 3. These results also show a decrease in the level of
financial expenses and long-term debts. In addition, the results show a statistically
significant increase in the level of corporate taxes among Finnish firms that belong
to MNEs. In general the size of the estimates presented in Table 5 are very similar
to our baseline estimates. Regarding the results in Section 6.1, it is worth noting
that because we were considering both control group companies located in Finland
and treatment group companies located outside Finland, the results in that section
need to be considered as conservative lower-bound estimates of the effects.
In Figure 4 we already compared the treatment group to an alternative compar-
31For other variables in Table 8 we do not find evidence of differences according to whether a
company received a high-intensity treatment or not.
32We also examine financial revenue and corporate taxes by treatment intensity among other
subsidiaries belonging to treated MNEs. The results are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix.
We find no heterogeneity in responses in this respect.
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ison group of companies that belong to Finnish MNEs but that were not affected by
the reform. As a further robustness check we estimate the effects of the reform on
all our main outcomes (H1-H7) using this alternative control group instead of the
control group used in the baseline analysis. The results are presented in Table 6.
The results are very similar to those presented in our baseline estimations in Table
3. Also, it is noticeable that the size of the estimates are very similar to baseline
estimates which gives us confidence to conclude that the introduction of an IB has
clear behavioral effects on MNEs.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the responses to the Finnish interest barrier. This is the first study
that evaluates the effects of interest barrier in case where no pre-reform restrictions
on the deductibility of interest expenses exist. This is also the first study that eval-
uates the effects of interest barrier by using comparable MNEs from other countries
as a control group. Employing the Orbis database with other Nordic MNEs serving
as a control group for Finnish MNEs, we find evidence of profit-shifting by MNEs.
More specifically, we find that the Finnish interest barrier, which restricts the de-
ductibility of financial expenses, decreases these expenses among Finnish MNEs by
25-30% compared to the control group. Subsidiaries reduced their long-term debt
levels, whereas for parent companies we do not find any changes in their debt levels.
In addition to debt-related responses we also study other responses. We do not
find evidence of increased transfer pricing following from the debt-shifting becoming
more expensive. Nor do we find evidence of real responses following the introduction
of the interest barrier. Therefore, the restriction does not seem to have adverse
effects, yet succeeds in its task of decreasing the financial expenses. In summary,
our study provides evidence supporting the positive view about the performance of
this particular anti-tax avoidance measure.
However, the firms may also have other means to affect their tax liabilities.
These include decisions concerning location of offices and intellectual property, group
structure and use of holding companies. The changes in EBITDA could track also
other than transfer pricing margins, but detailed information on changes in the group
structure and internal transactions of MNEs would be needed to observe whether
companies react to the IB by increasing the use of other methods. To our best
knowledge, no comprehensive high-quality data with such information is available
and studying whether firms react to IBs in these other ways is left for future research.
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Figure 5: Development of logs of overall debt, short-term debt, EBITDA and
turnover of companies of Finnish MNEs (Finns) and alternative control group of
companies of Finnish MNEs that were not affected by the reform (Control 2nd)
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